Propaganda of Islamic state in the Digital Age by Kūlis, Māris
XX
2016
UDK 2+17 (066) (08)
Re 515
Izdevums ir sagatavots LU Filozofijas un socioloģijas institūta projektā „Reliģiskās pieredzes 
tematizācija post-liberālā garīguma situācijā: Latvijas gadījums.” 
Izdevums rekomendēts publicēšanai ar LU Filozofijas un socioloģijas institūta Zinātniskās padomes  
2015. gada 8. decembra sēdes lēmumu.
Galvenā redaktore: Solveiga Krūmiņa-Koņkova
Redaktori: Jānis Nameisis Vējš, Māra Grīnfelde
Literārā redaktore: Arta Jāne
Maketētāja: Margarita Stoka
Vāka dizaina autori: Kārlis Koņkovs, Matīss Kūlis
Zinātniskās redakcijas kolēģija
Latvijas Universitāte:
Dr. phil.  asoc. profesore  Ella Buceniece;  Dr. phil. Solveiga  Krūmiņa-Koņkova;  Dr. habil. phil. 
akadēmiķe,  profesore Maija Kūle; Dr. hist. eccl., docents Andris Priede; Dr. habil. phil. profesore Māra 
Rubene; Dr. hist. Inese Runce; Dr. phil. profesors Igors Šuvajevs
Ārzemju locekļi:
Ekaterina Anastasova, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Studies with the 
Ethnographic Museum at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Bulgaria; Eileen Barker, Ph. D., OBE, 
FBA, Professor of Sociology with Special Reference to Study of Religion, The London School of Economics 
and Political Science, U.K.; Gloria Durka, Ph.D., Professor, Director, Ph.D. Program in Religious Education, 
Graduate School of Religion and Religious Education, Fordham University, U.S.A; Massimo Introvigne, 
Ph. D., Director of The Center for Studies on New Religions (CESNUR), Torino, Italia; Tõnu Lehtsaar, 
Ph.D., Professor of Psychology of Religion, Faculty of Theology, University of Tartu, Estonia; Massimo 
Leone, Ph.D., Dr.Hist.Art, Research Professor of Semiotics and Cultural Semiotics at the Department of 
Philosophy, University of Torino, Italy; Sebastian Rimestad, Ph.D., University of Erfurt, Germany; Dalia 
Maria Stančienė, Ph.D., Professor, Department of Philosophy and Culture Studies, Klaipeda University, 
Lithuania 
Reliģiski-filozofiski raksti ir anonīmi recenzēts periodisks izdevums ar starptautisku zinātniskās redakcijas 
kolēģiju. Tā mērķis ir padziļināt lasītāju zināšanas par reliģiski filozofisko ideju vēsturi, attīstību mūsdienās 
un to vietu Latvijas un Eiropas kultūrā. Iznāk vismaz vienu reizi gadā latviešu un angļu valodā. 
Reliģiski-filozofiski raksti pieejami arī Centrālās un Austrumeiropas Interneta bibliotēkā (Central and 
Eastern European Online Library, CEEOL), EBSCO un SCOPUS datubāzē.
Religious-Philosophical Articles is a double-blind peer reviewed periodical with international editorial board. 
It publishes articles aimed at deepening readers’ knowledge and understanding on history of religious 
philosophical ideas, their development in nowadays and their place in the Latvian and European culture. It 
is published at least once a year in Latvian and English.  
Editions of Religious-Philosophical Articles are available in Central and Eastern European On-line Library, 
CEEOL, as well as in EBSCO and SCOPUS data-bases.
© Latvijas Universitātes Filozofijas un socioloģijas institūts, 2016
ISSN 1407-1908
SaturS / ContentS
Solveiga Krūmiņa-Koņkova
Brīvība pagātnes sprostā. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    5
Freedom in the Cage of the Past . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    8
Raivis Bičevskis
Dzīvības gnostika pret prāta gribu. Sabiedrības bez pasaules kritika 
Ludviga Klāgesa darbos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
Summary. The Gnosis of Life versus the Will of the Mind. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
Ināra Cera
Par ticību un tikumību  Herdera Atvadu sprediķī, Rīgu atstājot,  
un viņa vēstures filozofijā . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
Summary. On Faith and Virtue in Herder`s Farewell Sermon  
in Riga and in His Philosophy of History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
Elizabete Taivāne 
Par reliģiskās pieredzes pētniecību: kognitīvās teorijas versus 
fenomenoloģiskais diskurss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  56
Summary. Investigation of Religious Experience: Cognitive  
Theories versus Phenomenological Discourse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73
Ernesta Molotokienė
The Outlooks of Christian Morality in the Context of  
Intercultural Information Ethics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  75
Kopsavilkums. Kristīgās morāles  perspektīvas starpkultūru  
informācijas ētikas kontekstā . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  97
Māris Kūlis
Propaganda of Islamic state in the Digital Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  98
Kopsavilkums. Islāma valsts propaganda informācijas laikmetā . . . . . . . . . . . . .112
Māris Kūlis
propaganda oF ISlamIc State 
in the digital age
Introduction
Since the beginning of 20th century the so-called political Islam has 
acquired diverse and at the same time enigmatic shapes. This could have 
various causes like being an underground movement or cultural policies of 
the Western countries. However, it is quite clear that, in contrast to some 
expectations,1 since the beginning of 21st century and especially since the 
rise of terroristic organization Islamic state in the Middle East, military 
jihad movement of political Islam has gained profound attention.
Almost countless atrocities performed by Islamic state and the exces-
sive brutality of it has diverged focus from the ideological and religious 
foundations of the group.2 The slip of focus has created impression that 
violence is purely senseless and just a means without any end. Such view-
point lacks justification, even though it is easily understandable as the 
victims can hardly distance themselves just to spot any ideas. However, it 
is clear that focusing on violence and modus operandi of it can significantly 
distort the understanding of Islamic state’s structure and aims. Violence, 
1 “War on Terror” by George W. Bush was intended to eradicate Islamic terrorism 
once and for all.
2 For more on diversity of the message of Islamic state see the research paper “The 
Virtual ‘Caliphate’: Understanding Islamic State’s Propaganda Strategy” by Charlie Win-
ter (Quilliam, 2015).
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indeed, is a significant element of the brand of Islamic state; however, it 
is just a part of more complex scene. As violence is mostly directed to-
wards external actors, i.e. showcased for aliens, meanwhile ideologues and 
 proselytizers of the Islamic state diligently work with internal affairs. It 
could be certainly stated that propaganda is one of the most important 
element of Islamic state.
Not in all cases attention is gained by those who deserve it. However, 
the case of Islamic state shows tendency that is substantial not only in the 
context of particular age or space but expresses trends of a much wider 
scale. Military and ultra-aggressive jihad, performed by Islamic state, in an 
unseen fineness, creates quasi-syncretic union of religious bigotry and the 
use of contemporary information technologies (both potentialities and 
consequences). The thesis is that Islamic state has successfully united two 
well-known subjects. One is information and communication technolo-
gies as well as social networks; another is military jihad.
The union employed by Islamic state challenges the false and rigid be-
lief that jihadists and terrorists are some somewhat technologically back-
ward radicals. Even more – revaluation of the tight relationship among 
religion, propaganda, and modern society, becomes philosophically re-
levant subject.
The use of contemporary digital technologies (including internet, com-
puters, and online social networks) has become global phenomenon and 
the impact on the lifestyle of majority of users seems to be un doubted.3 
The well-known subject of the digitalization of life encompass issues from 
the impact of technologies on the everyday life to the finesses of commu-
nication, though rarely average opinion has included idea that digitaliza-
tion could be in any sense related to jihad and terrorism.
3 The invasion of contemporary technologies in everyday life, especially addiction to 
smartphones, has become a topic of various researches. For example, see: Sherry Turkle. 
Reclaiming Conversation: The Power of Talk in a Digital Age; Sherry Turkle. Alone Together: 
Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each Other; Joseph M. Reagle Jr. Read-
ing the Comments: Likers, Haters, and Manipulators at the Bottom of the Web; Nir Eyal, Ryan 
Hoover. Hooked: How to Build Habit-Forming Products.
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The development and expansion of computer technologies goes on 
for several decades. It has created situation where especially youth has 
technological competency or know-how. Right now, in the year 2016, 
the median age of the population of the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) is reported to be 25 years.4 These young dissatisfied people have 
both know-how and gadgets and they are both the main target audience 
of jihadi ideologues and potential members of jihadi groups. One can 
only agree to the statement in the MIT Technology Review that Islamic 
state “emerged after important technological shifts”5. Such online services 
as YouTube, Twitter, Facebook etc. have gained notable popularity in the 
last five years, namely, long time after the 9/11 terror act. Leading French 
jihadi and political Islam researcher Gilles Kepel states that after decline 
of second-generation “top-down” television-driven jihadi organizations, 
like al-Qaeda, the bottom-top organized 3G or Third-Generation Jihad has 
born alongside YouTube and Twitter.6
Another element of quasi-syncretic union is extreme, fundamental, 
military or lower jihad of religious Islam with such examples as almost 
classical al-Qaeda as well as Boko Haram, Jabhat al-Nusra, Islamic state etc. 
Islamism, the violence of Islam, jihadism – all of these subjects have been 
extensively researched and have provoked a lot of discussions particularly 
after the boom of political Islam in the seventies of the 20th century. Jihad 
is not anything new or surprising. The very opposite, jihad has attracted 
4 See: Roudi, Farzaneh. Youth Population And Employment In The Middle East And 
North Africa: Opportunity Or Challenge? Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
United Nations Secretariat. New York : United Nations Secretariat, 2011. In comparison, 
European Union – 42.2 years (Eurostat, 2014); USA – 37.8 years (CIA World Factbook, 
2015).
5 Talbot, David. Fighting ISIS Online. MIT Technology Review. [Online] Septem-
ber 30, 2015. [Cited: April 11, 2016.] https://www.technologyreview.com/s/541801/
fighting-isis-online/.
6 The emergence of Third-Generation Jihad is a phenomenon examined in the book 
“Terreur dans l’Hexagone. Genèse du djihad français” by Gilles Kepel (Gallimard, 2015). 
First generation stretches from 1979 to 1997 and corresponds to the Soviet-Afghan war 
and consequences of it; second – from 1997 to 2005 and can be associated with Osama 
bin Laden.
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enormous amount of both true and false statements on it. A common 
prejudice is that violent jihad groups are technologically backward. The 
roots of such opinion could be found in their anti-western rhetoric and 
salafi ideology. However, the rejection of Western and Christian values 
does not necessary mean rejection of Western technological advance-
ments. Consequently the reality of the 21st century jihad is that it uses 
technologies, besides does it skilfully and a great deal.
Islamic extremism side by side with technological competence creates 
a new kind of warfare. It could be described as something close to the 
concept of hybrid war often attributed to Russia.7 Even though hybrid-
 anything should still be examined, here arises temptation to see Islamic 
state as an expert of the non-conventional warfare with undervalued 
capability to perform proselytization.
Founding Basis of the Propaganda 
of the Third-Generation Jihad
In the understanding of the specifics of the propaganda carried out by 
Islamic state stands out ideas of two individuals. One is military strategist 
Abu Musab al-Suri and another is imam Anwar al-Awlaki.
Organization vs. System
Abu Musab al-Suri (born Mustafa Setmariam Nasar) was born in 
Aleppo, Syria in October of 1958.8 Although he studied engineering in 
the University of Aleppo for four years, he abandoned studies in 1980 
in order to join The Combatant Vanguard Organization of the Muslim 
Brother hood in Syria. At the end of the year the group was almost in 
7 The understanding of this concept still has a lot of blank spaces. See: “Russian 
Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts” by Michael Kofman in http://warontherocks.com. 
Nevertheless exactly this obscurity of the concept is what makes attribution of it possible 
in the case of Islamic state.
8 For more on the life and works of al-Suri see: Lia, Brynjar. Architect of Global Jihad: 
The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab Al-Suri. London: Hurst Publishers, 2007.
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ruins and he was advised to leave Syria for Jordan. Later he immigrated 
to France and then to Spain, where he married Spanish woman and so be-
came Spanish citizen. Nonetheless, he kept close ties to Islamic radicalism 
and often travelled to Afghanistan where in year 1987 he met one of the 
most  important jihadi ideologues and the founding father of al-Qaeda – 
Abdallah Azzam, and become deeply impressed by him. Acquaintance 
with Azzam and regular stay in Afghanistan allowed him to build up 
close ties with Osama bin Laden too. All of that leads to consider that he 
was one of the founding members of al-Qaeda, and, during this period, he 
gained both experience and expertise.
The year 2005, with publication of Abu Musab al-Suri’s 1600-page 
long magnum opus “The Call to Global Islamic Resistance”, as noted by 
Gilles Kepel, marked the birth of the 3G or Third-Generation Jihad in 
the same year as online video service YouTube was registered in Califor-
nia. “The Military Theory of the Global Islamic Resistance Call”, section 
four of chapter eight, writes al-Suri, “is the heart of this two-volume 
book”9. Although military theory of al-Suri in a direct way does not 
concern religion and propaganda, his suggestion for a new way of or-
ganizing global jihadism is almost perfectly reflected in the propaganda 
machinery of Islamic state. In short, one of his main thesis, expressed in 
chapter eight, is distinction between two governance forms – organi-
zation and system (nizam la tanzim). Al-Suri writes that in the post 
9/11 world the previous form of governance, “the school of dynamic 
organizations” or simply organization, is no longer suitable. The main 
characteristics of organizations are that they are regional, secret, and 
hierarchical10, namely, they are made as pyramids. However, because of 
“the changes of time”, such form of governance is too dangerous. He 
9 Quoted from online document at http://ge.tt/1I9jhQs1; p. 7. However, it seems 
to be slightly modified Brynjar Lia’s translation of some excerpts published in his book 
“Architect of Global Jihad” (pp. 347–484).
10 al-Suri, Abu Musab. The Call for a Global Islamic Resistance (Key excerpts). 2005, 
pp. 9–13.
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compares it with a bag of water  – it does not matter where you poke the 
bag, water will pour out. 11
Al-Suri offers an alternative. He presents system as a better form of 
governance. In essence, it means that there are no single united chain of 
leadership. Instead al-Suri offers to use template of action and ideology, 
which can be used by small autonomous groups. He develops guidelines 
just like in a case of franchise licensing; he gives ready-made plan, ideol-
ogy, guidance, strategy etc. Brynjar Lia writes: “Hence, the practice of 
“individual terrorism” is a core theme in [The Call to Global Islamic Re-
sistance]. In other words, there should be “an operative system” or template 
available anywhere for anybody wishing to participate in the global jihad 
either on one’s own or with a small group of trusted associates.”12  Al-Suri 
points out that the central bonds of the “Global Islamic Resistance Bri-
gades” would be just three: (1) the common name and the personal oath 
to Allah; (2) the politico-judicial programme (shar’iyy manhaj) and a com-
mon doctrine (‘aqeedah); (3) the common goal to resist the invaders, and 
then to work on establishing Islamic sharia.13
The military strategies of al-Suri does not have great significance from 
the perspective of religion. His importance lies nearby, as precisely com-
mented by Brynjar Lia: “The danger of al-Suri’s training doctrine lies 
in its very realistic assumptions about the jihadis’ military weakness. His 
doctrine seems to be cleanly and pragmatically tailored to the security 
situation in the Western world of the post-9/11 era.”14 One could add 
that with little modifications al-Suri’s ideas provide dangerous prospects 
for contemporary and future jihadi propaganda activists. The significance 
of al-Suri’s ideas can be revealed in the context of propaganda campaign 
11 Video lecture of al-Suri: https://archive.org/details/TNMJPARTONE 
12 Al-Suri’s Doctrines for Decentralized Jihadi Training – Part 1. Lia, Brynjar. 1, s.l.: 
The Jamestown Foundation, February 21, 2007, Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 5.
13 al-Suri, Abu Musab. The Call for a Global Islamic Resistance (Key excerpts). 2005. 
Most probably translation by Brynjar Lia, p. 45.
14 Al-Suri’s Doctrines for Decentralized Jihadi Training – Part 2. Lia, Brynjar. 2, s.l.: 
The Jamestown Foundation, February 21, 2007, Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 5.
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performed by Islamic state. The transition from hierarchical organization 
to self-dependant system directly corresponds with distinction, by French 
philosopher Jacques Ellul, between vertical and horizontal propaganda. 
This distinction will be essential latter in the following text.
State-of-the-Art Jihad
The life story of Anwar al-Awlaki and al-Suri to some extent are 
alike. Both of them could not complain about poverty or unfavourable 
conditions, both were educated and both got involved in jihadi move-
ments. Al-Awlaki was born in 1971 in New Mexico, USA. His parents 
were quite well situated immigrants from Yemen with good education. 
His father Nasser al-Awlaki was Fulbright Scholar and received a doctor-
ate at the University of Nebraska. His family returned to Yemen where 
his father held high ranking position in government. Higher education 
was obtained also by Anwar al-Awlaki. Following his stay in Yemen he 
returned to USA in 1991 where he earned a BSc in civil engineering 
from Colorado State University and latter in 2000 he enrolled in George 
Washington University for doctoral studies. At the same time he under-
took the position of imam at mosque first in California (1996) and latter 
in Virginia (2001). While fulfilling his clerical duties he discovered in 
himself not only great talent for such job but also developed his devotion 
to religion. Complications in Anwar al-Awlaki’s life started after the 9/11 
attacks (he publicly condemned it) when he attracted the eyes of security 
institutions of USA. Troubled by problems in personal and public life, 
he left USA for Yemen. Turning point in his life could be 2007 when, 
after serving 18 months in prison in Yemen and sensing too much atten-
tion from local security establishment, he contacted local al-Qaeda branch 
AQAP15 and joined the jihadi club.16
15 Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
16 For more on the life of Anwar al-Awlaki see: Shane, Scott. Objective Troy: A Ter-
rorist, a President, and the Rise of the Drone. s.l. : Tim Duggan Books, 2015; Scott Shane. 
The Anwar al-Awlaki File. From American Citizen to Imam to Terrorist to Drone Killing 
(http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB529-Anwar-al-Awlaki-File/)
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In the context of quasi-syncretic union between propaganda practiced 
by Islamic state and contemporary technologies, one particular dimension 
of al-Awlaki’s actions is of special importance. Namely, he proposed, sup-
ported and implemented idea that jihadi organizations should act in con-
cordance with reality of modern world and consequently should spread the 
message of true believers by utilizing up-to-date technologies. Moreover, 
he proposed to do it with care so that result would not be just ideologically 
right and bright but equally good-looking, attractive, interesting etc. In 
the year 2009 he published online document called “44 Ways to Support 
Jihad”, where No. 29 is “WWW Jihad”; al-Awlaki writes: “The internet 
has become a great medium for spreading the call of Jihad and following 
the news of the mujahideen.”17 Researcher of terroristic jihadi movements 
Abdel Bari Atwan writes: “Anwar al-Awlaki, a US-born, youthful cleric... 
was the first to suggest exploiting social networking platforms to spread 
jihadist material more widely and reach new recruitment pools. The so-
called bin Laden of the Internet created his own blog, Facebook page, 
and YouTube channel, and used them to distribute the online magazine 
Inspire, which included recipes for bomb-making and increasingly sophis-
ticated films.”18
One of the most well-known results of this approach was English 
language magazine Inspire. Al-Awlaki’s new-born magazine attracted 
mass attention partly because of sensation-seeking journalism, and per-
haps partly because of al-Awlaki’s close ties to the USA. Even though it 
is rightly pointed out by Western jihadi analysts that emergence of new 
journal was nothing impressive19 or extra-ordinary20, it still is emblematic 
representation of certain ideological and technological trend. Eventually 
17 al-Awlaki, Anwar. 44 Ways to Support Jihad. 18 January 2009.
18 Atwan, Abdel Bari. Islamic State. The Digital Caliphate. London : Saqi Books, 2015, 
p. 11.
19 Hegghammer, Thomas. Un-Inspired. Jihadica. [Online] July 6, 2010. [Cited: 
April 14, 2016.] http://www.jihadica.com/un-inspired/.
20 Berger, J. M. AQAP Inspire Magazine Is Nothing New. Intelwire. [Online] 
July 5, 2010. [Cited: April 14, 2016.] http://news.intelwire.com/2010/07/aqap-inspire-
 magazine-is-nothing-new.html.
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this particular magazine is not of particular concern. Instead, the thing 
one should keep in mind is that it attests the rise of worldview – both 
from the perspective of the Western world and jihadi networks – that 
includes presence of particular modus operandi, namely, very aggressive and 
resistant propaganda mechanism. 
The first issue of Inspire saw digital light in the June 2010 but 
 al-Awlaki’s influence reaches far beyond this one event. He can be cre-
dited as pioneer of use of social networks for promotion of jihadi materi-
als. Al-Awlaki was excellent preacher, but part of his success, as noted by 
Scott Shane, was “the shifting communication technology between 2001 
and 2008, moving from audio cassette, to CD, to Paltalk, to his own in-
teractive website and blog, and finally to Facebook and YouTube.”21
Of course, on the one side, to some ultra-orthodox salafi jihadists the 
use of World Wide Web could seem to be vicious. However, on the other 
side, everyone had to acknowledge that it is step forward to reach society 
drowned in computer screens. If al-Awlaki’s approach could provide new 
recruits then it was good for jihadi matter. Right now at the beginning of 
year 2016 (especially after Islamic state’s unrelenting activity during  Syrian 
Civil War and re-emergence among turbulent conditions in Iraq) it ap-
pears to be productive.22
Unconditional propaganda
Two elements described above can be considered as the basis for 
emergence of mass propaganda in internet. System approach by al-Suri 
jointly with the use of social networks (and other tools provided by inter-
21 Shane, Scott. Objective Troy: A Terrorist, a President, and the Rise of the Drone. s.l. : 
Tim Duggan Books, 2015.
22 Theological wisdom or religious expertise of the recruits of Islamic state can be 
rightly doubted. However, the appeal of religious ideas actively distributed by Islamic state 
seems to be self-evident. In year 2015 among Islamic state fighters are estimated to be 
approximately 20 to 30 thousand foreign fighters. The estimate total strength in various 
sources varies between 20 and 300 thousand fighters.
107
net) by al-Awlaki created fertile ground for occurrence of propaganda of 
Islamic state. Though here one thing is even more important – it is mark 
of the age. Contemporary situation opens new ground for uncontrolled 
and unconditional propaganda. French philosopher Jacques Ellul writes: 
“The aim of modern propaganda is no longer to modify ideas, but to 
provoke action. It is no longer to change adherence to a doctrine, but to 
make the individual cling irrationally to a process of action. It is no longer 
to transform an opinion but to arouse an active and mythical belief.”23 
The weapon of Islamic state’s propaganda is social networks. Thereby it 
sounds well-founded, as said by managing director of think-tank Quil-
liam Haras Rafiq, that “jihadism is digitalised and brought firmly into the 
21st century.”24
In the research paper “The Weaponization of Social Media”, published 
by Royal Danish Defence College, Thomas Elkjer Nissen states, that “we 
can see the contours of a very calculated and professional social media 
information campaign which resembles modern cross-media marketing 
or political PR campaigns.”25
With reference to Rose Powell, he distinguishes four levels of online 
activities:
Leading propagandists of 1. Islamic state. Usually main source of of-
ficial news.
Regional or provincial accounts that disseminate news about local 2. 
events.
“Individual fighters that post updates about their experiences on 3. 
what is meant to appear as personal accounts. These are more per-
sonal, emotional and therefore appealing to, e.g., young potential 
recruits.”
23 Ellul, Jacques. Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes. [trans.] Konrad  Kellen 
and Jean Lerner. New York : Vintage Books, 1973, p. 25.
24 Rafiq, Haras. Foreword. [book auth.] Charlie Winter. The Virtual ‘Caliphate’: Un-
derstanding Islamic State’s Propaganda Strategy. s.l.: Quilliam, 2015, p. 4.
25 Nissen, Thomas Elkjer. The Weaponization of Social Media. Copenhagen: Royal 
Danish Defence College, 2015, pp. 49–50.
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Fourth and last level is most innovative and dangerous. It is in 4. 
a kind do-it-yourself approach without control from the centre. 
It mostly consists of sympathisers and supporters outside the war 
zone.
With problem of uncontrolled propaganda in mind, most interesting 
are the members of the last or lowest level, namely, the  disseminators. 
 Nissen recognizes that “all four levels use the centralised strategic nar-
rative as the framework or as direction and guidance for their use of 
images and messages in the different social media platforms support-
ing their propaganda activities”, but he also emphasises that while the 
content is initially coordinated, as it follows the way of dissemination, 
it “changes result in some loss of control of the message, and hence the 
narrative.”26 
Even if al-Suri was mostly thinking about armed struggle, his ideas 
clearly can be utilized in the dissemination of propaganda. The case of 
Islamic state seems to be clear evidence of that. In the massive use of un-
attached disseminators, Islamic state stands out on the background of more 
conservative jihadi groups. It departs from the archaic understanding of 
jihadi terrorism for more modern approach, namely, if one cannot fight in 
the battlefield on the land, then one could do it in the internet! It gives 
options to all those who are disgusted with gory jobs.
For all of that still the most impressive aspect of Islamic state’s propa-
ganda is that it levels differences between the creators and the dissemina-
tors of the content. For example, in the case of television distinction is 
very clear. However, social networks of internet radically changes situation. 
If television is not accessible to everyone, then blogs, YouTube channels, 
Twitter accounts can be created by anyone, besides youth of the MENA 
countries (as youth everywhere else) has explicit knowledge of how-to to 
do so. That is particularly advantageous for Islamic state because helps to 
outsource part of the duties and greatly enhances safety of central leader-
26 Nissen, Thomas Elkjer. The Weaponization of Social Media. Copenhagen: Royal 
Danish Defence College, 2015, p. 52.
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ship. The outsourcing of agitation is a way to balance previously men-
tioned two kinds of propaganda outlined by Jacques Ellul, namely, vertical 
and horizontal propaganda.27
The main difference, described in Ellul’s book “Propaganda: The For-
mation of Men’s Attitudes”, between both types of propaganda is the 
amount of dependence to some central management. Vertical propaganda 
functions as hierarchical transfer from top to bottom. Horizontal propa-
ganda, just like al-Suri’s military strategy, is made as bottom-top method 
or, if more precisely, anti-method. Horizontal propaganda as a way of 
spreading certain stance (in this case narrow interpretation of religious 
cause) lets participators to choose the most appropriate technique in each 
case or to simply stay in safe distance from clearly evident guilt of illegal 
agitation. Thus the propaganda of Islamic state simultaneously both is and 
is not chaotic, to wit, it is self-organizing constellation. The lack of centre 
seriously limits options to quickly and effectively counter the propaganda 
of Islamic state; however, even more dangerous and worrying is the whole 
system as an example of success. The contemporary world, whether just 
now or also in past, with its vices, social injustices, discrimination, con-
flicts etc. is fertile ground for emergence of various forms of activisms. 
Ellul writes: “The individual who burns with desire for action but does 
not know what to do is a common type in our society. He wants to act for 
the sake of justice, peace, progress, but does not know how. If propaganda 
can show him this ‘how’ then it has won the game; action will surely 
follow.”28 Recent terroristic acts in Belgium and France29 clearly show 
such actions. Therefore, contemporary jihad cannot be seen as a limited 
phenomenon. It has become mark of an age, namely, it is an expression 
27 Distinction described by Jacques Ellul first in “Propagandes” (1962). See: Ellul, J. 
Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes. New York : Vintage Books, 1973, pp. 79–
84.
28 Ellul, Jacques. Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes. [trans.] Konrad Kel-
len and Jean Lerner. New York : Vintage Books, 1973, p. 209.
29 Not to name almost endless killings in Middle East, the bombing of Russian air-
craft and so on.
Māris Kūlis. Propaganda of Islamic state in the Digital Age
Reliģiski-filozofiski raksti XX110
or a  manifestation of the wide arrangement of elements deeply rooted in 
the processes of present life-world. The understanding and derogation of 
Islamic state’s propaganda is equally important as the armed struggle in 
the ongoing war.
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Kopsavilkums
Politiskā islāma militārā jeb mazā džihāda kustība un organizācija 
 Islāma valsts (Daesh, ISIS, ISIL, IS) ir “izkarojusi sev” pastiprinātu uzma-
nību ne tikai ar vardarbību vien, bet arī ar līdz šim neredzētu propagan-
das kampaņu, kuras panākumus apliecina diezgan liels ārvalstu kaujinieku 
pieplūdums organizācijas armijas rindās. Šī situācija izgaismo filosofiski 
satraucošu mūsdienu sabiedrības situāciju, kurā Islāma valsts ir sekmīgi 
apvienojusi divus jau labi zināmus, taču nošķirtus tematus, proti, (1) infor-
mācijas un komunikācijas tehnoloģijas, tostarp sociālos tīklus, ar (2) mili-
tāro vai karojošo džihādisma kustību. Islāma valsts īstenotais militārais 
un ārkārtīgi agresīvais džihāds ar vēl nepieredzētām sekmēm ir izveidojis 
sinkrētisku reliģiskās degsmes un mūsdienu tehnoloģiju lietojuma kom-
bināciju.
Neskaitāmo Islāma valsts īstenoto vardarbības aktu brutalitāte ir no-
vērsusi uzmanību no tās ideoloģiskajiem un reliģiskajiem pamatiem. Lai 
gan vardarbība nudien ir viens no Islāma valsts “zīmola” būtiskiem elemen-
tiem, tā ir tikai daļa no daudz plašākas kopainas, kurā propagandas darbs 
Islāma valsts gadījumā ir izšķirīgi svarīgs.
Islāma valsts īstenotās propagandas metodes teorētiskos pamatus var 
saistīt ar divām personālijām – militārā džihāda stratēģi Abu Musabu 
 al-Suri (Abu Musab al Suri; īstajā vārdā Mustafa Setmariam Nasar) un 
imamu, tīmekļa aktīvistu Anvaru al-Avlaki (Anwar al-Awlaki).
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Sīrijā dzimušais Spānijas pilsonis Abu Musabs al-Suri 2005. gada jan-
vārī tīmeklī laida klajā savu sacerējumu “Aicinājums uz vispasaules islāma 
pretošanos” (The Call to Global Islamic Resistance). Šajā darbā centrālā vieta 
veltīta teroristisko grupējumu pārvaldes formu izvērtējumam. Al-Suri uz-
sver nošķīrumu starp “organizāciju” un “sistēmu” (nizam la tanzim). Viņš 
raksta, ka ilgstoši izmantotā džihādistu grupējumu pārvaldes forma – or-
ganizācija – ir bīstama un nepiemērota. Tā vietā viņš ierosina izmantot 
franšīzes principu, proti, izveidot “sistēmu”, kuras potenciālie darboņi va-
rētu pārņemt sagatavi – plānu, vadlīnijas, ideoloģiju, uzskatu sistēmu u.tml. 
Tādā veidā tiktu veicināta mazu un autonomu grupiņu izveide, kuras savā 
starpā saistītu vien trīs nosacījumi: kopīgs nosaukums un mērķis, kopīga 
politiskā un juridiskā programma un doktrīna, kā arī kopīga cīņa pret 
ienaidniekiem, lai izveidotu islāmisku valsti.
Savukārt Anvara al-Avlaki (Anwar al-Awlaki) nopelns propagandas 
izplatīšanas kontekstā ir viņa ierosinājums pievērst arvien lielāku uzma-
nību mūsdienu tehnoloģijām un sociālajiem tīkliem. Viņš ierosināja, vei-
cināja un īstenoja ideju, ka džihādistu organizācijām vajadzētu sekot laika 
garam un savu ticības vēsti izplatīt ar jaunāko datortehnoloģiju starpnie-
cību. Turklāt viņš ierosināja to darīt nevis vienkārši un pavirši, bet gan vel-
tīt tam pūliņus tā, lai rezultāts būtu ne tikai ideoloģiski pareizs, bet arī glīti 
un patīkami “iesaiņots”. Viņš darbojās laikā, kad pasaulē arvien populārāki 
kļuva tādi tiešsaistes pakalpojumi kā YouTube, Facebook, emuāri.
Al-Suri ieteiktais džihādistu organizāciju hierarhiskās pārvaldes for-
mas noraidījums un autonomo šūniņu izveide kopsolī ar al-Avlaki iero-
sināto uzsvaru uz mūsdienu interneta tehnoloģiju (piemēram, tiešsaistes 
sociālo tīklu) izmantošanu, ir sagatavojusi auglīgu augsni t.s. trešās pa-
audzes džihāda (third-generation jihad) tapšanai un Islāma valsts propa-
gandas īstenošanai. Aizgājušo laiku otrās paaudzes džihāda komunikācijas 
formu – televīziju – nomaina tiešsaistes pakalpojumu izvirzīšanās teju ik-
katras saskarsmes priekšplānā. Militārā džihāda un mūsdienu tehnoloģiju 
(gan sniegto iespēju, gan izraisīto seku) izmantošanas savienība tieši sabal-
sojas ar franču filosofa Žaka Elula vertikālās un horizontālās propagandas 
nošķīrumu. Vertikālā propaganda funkcionē kā hierarhiska kārtība, kurā 
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vēsti nodod no augšas uz leju. Savukārt horizontālā propaganda, gluži kā 
al-Suri militārā stratēģija, tiek īstenota no apakšas uz augšu.
Prasmīgi veidotas un apjomīgi izvērstas ideoloģiskās ietekmēšanas 
kampaņas, proti, propagandas izplatīšanas kontekstā īpašu ievērību izpelnās 
vertikālās propagandas zemākais līmenis jeb t. s. vēsts izplatītāji. Masveidā 
izmantojot šo slāni, Islāma valsts izceļas uz citu – “konservatīvāku” – te-
roristisko organizāciju fona. Proti, tiem, kas nespēj karot kaujaslaukā, ļauj 
pašiem uzņemties iniciatīvu internetā! Tas ir vairojis Daesh atbalstītāju 
skaitu, jo darbs atrodas arī tiem, kam klaja vardarbība derdzas.
Propagandas īstenotājiem tiek dota autonomija pašiem izvērtēt 
 situāciju un atbilstoši rīkoties, kā arī palikt drošībā. Tādējādi Islāma valsts 
propaganda, kas visdrīzāk izmanto šādu metodi, vienlaikus gan ir, gan nav 
haotiska. Proti, tā ir kontrolēta jucekļa pašpārvalde. Kāda noteikta vadības 
centra neesamība būtiski apgrūtina propagandas apkarošanu. Tomēr vēl 
būtiskāks un bīstamāks ir paraugs, ko rada un parāda Islāma valsts panā-
kumi.
Mūsdienu džihāda spējas pārkāpt fiziskās robežas un piemēroties mo-
dernajai pasaulei mudina domāt, ka Islāma valsts propagandas satura un 
uzbūves izpratne ir tikpat svarīgs uzdevums kā bruņota cīņa. Kareivīgā 
džihāda un mūsdienu tehnoloģiju savienība ir kļuvusi par laikmeta zīmi, 
proti, tā ir teorētisko ideju un pastāvošās kultūras situācijas manifestācija.
